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If this review were to be given a title it might well be called "The Formulae of
Jurisdiction and the Multiple Taxation Problem." For whatever the dissimilarity of
these books may be, they are alike in expressing the firm belief of the authors that
the complexity and confusion which exist in the law of tax jurisdiction can largely
-be eliminated if the courts will apply the correct general formulae of jurisdiction.
The formula which Professor Stimson sets forth consists of two principles: first,
the "fundamental principle" that "jurisdiction is physical power", and second, the
"principle of fairness" contained in the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The limitation on the taxing power resulting from the first principle the
author calls the "international law limitation", while he refers to the limitation arising from an application of the second principle as the "constitutional limitation".
The "power principle" or "international law limitation", is expressed in the terms of
Story's familiar statement of territorial jurisdiction that "A sovereignty's legislative
power is limited, except as to its citizens located abroad, to persons and property
within its own territory." Accordingly, continues Professor Stinson, a sovereignty
has no power to tax where neither the person nor the property taxed is located
within its boundaries unless such person is one of its citizens, and conversely it does
have power to tax where either the person or the property or both are located within
its territory. When the person and property are located in different jurisdictions, the
sovereignty in which the person is located "has power to tax it" but "has no power to
assert a personal claim against nonresident aliens." Since the state where the property
is located and the state where the owner resides both have power to levy a tax
measured by the value of the property, the undesirable result is double tamtion. It
is here that the second principle, "the rule of fairness" of the Fourteenth Amendment, enters the field as a "supervening constitutional limitation" prohibiting double
taxation by the states of the Union. Throughout his book the author keeps his discussion of the "power principle" distinct from that of the "fairness principle" devoting seventy-three pages to the first and only nineteen to the second. This division
Of the material affords, he asserts, "the basis for a critical estimate of the decisions.'
The critical reader will wonder how any student of the subject could have written
such a book in the year 1933. The doctrine expressed by Professor Stimson might
have gone unquestioned in the days of Mr. Justice Field, but at the present time it
only strikes a note of confusion. This confusion results first from the author's attempt to predicate jurisdiction on some concept of physical power, and second, his
assumption that there are legal restrictions on the taxing power other than those
contained in constitutional limitations on legislative action.
The fallacy of the power concept of tax jurisdiction is perfectly clear if ve consider the possible relation of taxation to any exercise of physical power. Taxation
involves first, the imposition of a personal obligation on the taxpayer or a lien on
his property, and second, the enforcement of this obligation or lien by seizure of the
taxpayer's person or property, usually the latter. Since tax obligations and liens are
nothing more than legal concepts, their creation is not a physical act and in no way
involves the exercise of physical power. However, the enforcement of the obligation, or lien, against the recalcitrant taxpayer can be accomplished only by seizing
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the defendant's person or property, and consequently the power to collect a tax does
include the power to exercise physical control over the taxpayer or his property.
Since this is the only exercise of physical power involved in taxation, the only reasonable meaning that can be given to such a statement as "jurisdiction to tax is based
upon physical power" is that the power to impose a tax is based upon the physical
power to collect it. This would mean that jurisdiction to tax exists when, and only
when, there is the physical power to enforce the tax by seizing the taxpayer or his
property. But obviously such is not the case. There may be jurisdiction to impose
a tax when there is no power to collect it, as for example in the case of citizens
resident abroad, and on the other hand all the cases in which the courts have held
that there was no jurisdiction have presented situations where the power to collect
the tax not only existed, but its exercise was entirely too probable to suit the taxpayer's interests. Since the creation of a tax liability is not itself a physical act, and
is not dependent upon the power to collect the tax, an attempt to frame a principle
of jurisdiction in terms of physical power serves only to confuse the real issues presented in the jurisdiction cases.
The second source of confusion in Professor Stimson's book is the assumption that
there are legal limitations on the taxing power other than those contained in the constitution. The author evidently believes that the rules of international law, whether
public or private he does not indicate, somehow impose certain restrictions oh the
taxing power quite independent of constitutional limitations. The whole book is
arranged on this assumption, yet the reader is left at a loss to understand how such
a view can possibly be consistent with the established constitutional doctrine that a
court will hold an act of the legislature void only when it conflicts with some provision of the Constitution. Rules of the conflict of laws or of public international law
constitute limitations on legislative action only to the extent to which the courts
have read them into some constitutional provision, the one usually employed for this
purpose being the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In the early
tax jurisdiction cases1 the Supreme Court was inclined to predicate its decisions
upon a strict territorial theory of sovereignty which theretofore had found its chief
application in the field of conflict of laws and which never should have been relied
upon in construing constitutional limitations on legislative power. However, in
recent years the court has shifted its point of view, and now the rules of jurisdiction,
like other limitations read into the due process clause, have become essentially rules
of reasonableness rather than abstract deductions from some concept of territorial
sovereignty. The author's treatment of his subject tends to clothe the territorial
theory of jurisdiction with an apparent validity and inflexibility which it does not
possess.
Professor Stimson's approach also leads him into a faulty and very misleading
analysis of the cases. For example, in discussing the application of his "power principle" he asserts, "The United States Supreme Court has held that a tax upon persons subject to a sovereignty's power may be measured by foreign real estate. ' 2 As
authority for this very startling statement he cites the case of The Delaware Rail.
1. The two earliest cases Professor Stimson does not cite: Railroad Co. v. Jackson, 7
Wall. 262 (U. S.1868); St. Louis v. The Ferry Co. 11 Wall. 423 (U. S.1870).
2. P. 8.
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road Taz3? and Cook v. Tai. 4 Neither one of these cases can be taken to sustain
the proposition, and the Supreme Court has never adopted such a rule.5 Moreover, a number of English cases are cited for the statement that "the sovereignty
having power over the deceased at the time of his death has no power to impose an
inheritance tax on foreign property."O They all involve questions of statutory construction and of course none of them hold that Parliament has no power to impose
such an inheritance tax if it sees fit to do so. In a number of places T throughout
the book Blackstone v. Miller is cited and discussed with no indication that it has
been expressly overruled.
Professor Harding's book, the first of the Harvard Studies in the Conflict of Laws,
is a much more elaborate and intensive work than that of Professor Stimson. In the
first three chapters the author briefly outlines the course of the Supreme Court decisions down to Burnet v. Brooks,s criticises the control and benefit theories of tamtion and proposes his own formula of jurisdiction which he calls the integration
theory. The remainder, and bulk of the book, is devoted to a discussion of the
cases involving jurisdiction to tax property, transfers of property, persons, acts and
income.
By the integration theory the state may, according to Professor Harding, "tax
all property goods, labor services, and the like, which have become identified with
the economic structure of the state, by incorporation into or integration with the
business mechanism so defined" and "the state is without power to tax wealth which
has not become so integrated with this economic mechanism, even though the state

may afford that property some protection, even though it may confer upon that
property some benefit, and even though it may have the power to exercise some
control over the property or have jurisdiction over it in the larger sense of power
to affect rights in the property."9 The author proposes the integration test as a
juristic doctrine which "rationalizes the distinctions and demarcations which appear in
the decided cases;" which constitutes "in substance what was actually in the minds
of the courts, either consciously or unconsciously, in making the distinctions and
demarcations;" and finally, which "can be used to reach rational and just decisions
in a fairly efficient manner in the troublesome cases which may arise in the future"' 09
Whether Professor Harding's theory has been, consciously or unconsciously, in
the minds of the judges I would not attempt to say, but I think it is pretty clear
that it does not rationalize the distinctions in the decided cases nor point the way
for the decisions of the future. It is in the borderline case that any doctrine must
3. 18 Wall. 206 (U. S. 1873). In this case the court sustained a Delaware tax on a
Delaware corporation which was measured by capital stock and apportioned on the track
mileage basis. It was shown that the ratio which the value of the property in Delaware bore
to the total value of the property owned by the corporation was les than the ratio which
the track mileage in Delaware bore to the total track mileage.
4. 265 U. S. 47 (1924). The court sustained the federal income tax as applied to the
income of a nonresident citizen derived from sources outside the United States.
S. Louisville & Jeffersonvile Ferry Co. v. Kentucky, 188 U. S. 385 (190) is ordinarily
accepted as establishing the law to be just the opposite of what Professor Stimson states
it to be.
6. P. 73. The cases are cited in n. 170.
7.

Pp. 22, 26, 29, 30.

8. 288 U. S. 378 (1933).

The case came out too late to be included in the text but is

cited in the notes. One wonders how the author would have treated it.
9. P. 42.
10. P. 45.
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prove its value, and in this situation the author's handling of his own theory is not
at all convincing. His argument that a debt is "integrated" at the domicile of the
creditor is very strained. It is difficult to see why a debt is necessarily "integrated"
anywhere, and when the author speaks of the maxim, mobilia sequuntur personam,
as a "very helpful organizing fiction" creating a presumption that intangibles are
"integrated" at the domicile of the owner, he has departed completely from the
realistic plane upon which he claims to be discussing his subject.
The difficulty with the integration formula is that it is based upon the theory that
the economic structure of a state is a unit distinct from the economic structures of
other states. The truth is that most business today is run on a national, international or at least multi-state basis, and when any item of wealth is integrated in a
business it frequently becomes part of a business unit which extends throughout a
number of states. In this situation a theory of tax jurisdiction which attempts
to allocate a part of the business to one state or another according to whether it is
"integrated" with the economic life of that state is just as fictional and just as difficult to apply as the benefit theory or any other of the theories which Professor
Harding criticizes.
To say that Professor Harding's test does not measure up to the standards he has
set for it is not a criticism of his industry or ability for he has attempted the impossible. The alpha and omega of the law of jurisdiction is not to be found in any general rule that can be framed. Just what proportion of the wealth of the New York,
New Haven and Hartford Railroad, for example, should be taxed by the state of
Connecticut depends upon a multitude of factors which cannot be expressed in any
juristic formula. It is extremely doubtful whether the Supreme Court ever should
have undertaken the judicial control of multiple taxation; perhaps the problem could
be handled better by legislation; but if the court continues on the course it charted
in Farmers' Loan and Trust Company v. Minnesota"1 it will have to pick its way
from case to case, giving in each instance pragmatic consideration to the factors
which may render the particular tax desirable or undesirable.
I have availed myself of the reviewer's privilege of dwelling upon those aspects
of Professor Harding's book with which I disagree, but I do not wish to leave the
impression that it is not a very creditable piece of work. My disagreement is with
the author's point of view, not the manner in which he has presented it. He has
brought to the consideration of a very difficult subject an originality, thoroughness
and facility of style which set a high standard for future Harvard Studies in the
Conflict of Laws.
Durham, North Carolina.
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BOTH of these works offer materials identical with those contained in slightly
earlier casebooks by their respective editors. In both, certain topics included in
the prior volumes have been omitted in the books under review-apparently for
the benefit of law schools which do not desire to include in a single course all
11.
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